Contents
1. On Change in the Mediterranean
Dimitar Bechev and Isabel Schäfer p. 3
2. Migrants as Agents of Change in the Euro-Mediterranean Area
Mehdi Lahlou p. 15
3. Protest Movements in Egypt: the Case of Kefaya
Nahed Ezzeldeen p. 29
4. Algerian Entrepreneurs as Both Agents of Change
and Means for Preserving the System
Amel Boubekeur p. 43
About the authors p. 59
On Change in the Mediterranean
Dimitar Bechev and Isabel Schäfer
Collective imagination associates the Mediterranean with continuity rather than change. While
Fernand Braudel’s concept of longue durée dominates the study of Mediterranean past, observers
of current affairs lament the persistence of authoritarianism, violent conflict and economic
stagnation across the Middle East and North Africa. That was not the case a mere decade ago
when the Barcelona Process was launched by the EU together with the governments of the socalled
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, including the present-day member states of Malta
and Cyprus. Barcelona’s vision was very much in tune with the prevailing liberal mood in the
West and elsewhere in the wake of the Cold War. Inspired by Kantian internationalism, the
scenario entailed the peaceful spread of democracy, economic interdependence, and the growth
of co-operative institutions governing relations between states. This vision never came to fruition.
Indeed local responses to a stream of external initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, most recently, the Union for
the Mediterranean (UFM) have struck a dissonant note with abstract notions of transformation
and ‘normative power’ recycled by the students of international politics, European integration
and transitions to democracy.
While bicoastal links in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have expanded from the
mid-1990s thanks to the liberalization packages pushed forward by the EU, the Middle East and
North Africa have been largely immune to the waves of democratization sweeping adjacent
regions, from Turkey to parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 2000s, the derailment of the Oslo
Peace Process, 9/11, the US invasion of Iraq, the wars in Lebanon and Gaza have all added to a
particularly inhospitable regional environment, torpedoing the multilateral frameworks tasked
with improving relations between states and peoples through functional integration. President
Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean, with its Secretariat rendered dysfunctional, is the
latest casualty of the region’s volatile politics. Meanwhile, the muscular US agenda for the
unilateral promotion of democracy, beloved to the Bush administration and its neocon gurus, has
hit a wall with its inability to nudge local allies such as Egypt to undertake more than cosmetic
changes of their political system. The electoral victory of Hamas in 2005, for its part, fuelled
fears that, contrary to liberal postulates, democratization breeds conflict and instability, not
peaceful transformation and compromise on divisive issues related to territorial borders or
fundamental political values. It made even more acute the impossible choice between stagnation
and socio-political change threatening, at least in Western perceptions, to open the Pandora box
of radical Islam.

Though not misleading, the above certainly is a very broad-brushed portrayal which
glosses over the diversity of cases in the ‘Southern and Eastern Mediterranean’ as well as the
complexity of the transformations in politics, economic and social affairs of particular countries
and regional clusters. Written by authors from the ‘South’, the papers included in this collective
working paper challenge both the fallacy of inevitable change and the fallacy of eternal
stagnation. Rather than positing a stark choice between authoritarianism and instability, they
emphasize the empowerment of various social actors, such as civic groups, migrants and
businesses, altering the mode of the state’s interaction with society in Morocco, Egypt and
Algeria. These empirical studies illuminate their potential but also inherent limitations to act as
agents of change capable of setting entirely new ‘rules of the game’. Through them, the present
set of papers seeks to go beyond both wishful thinking and essentialist notions of the ‘Muslim
societies’ or Arab countries as eternal captives of their modern history or cultural features.
What one is left, at the end of the day, is incrementalism with multiple faces and
trajectories. It is observable, for instance, in the strategies adopted by outside actors such as the
EU. The southern branch of the ENP privileges economic opening and gains in ‘good
governance’ to conditionality predicated on democratic reform, irrespective of the latter’s
inclusion in the bilateral action plans concluded and ‘jointly owned’ by the European
Commission and partner governments. The contrast with the EU’s conditionality-based policies
in post-communist Europe but also, significantly, vis-a-vis Turkey is clear. With the Obama
administration in power, the use approach has converged with that of the EU. While previously
pursuing a course focused on military aid and direct political pressure, America looks more
favourably at Euro-style caution seeking to minimize the risks of ‘backsliding’ to harsher forms
of authoritarianism or civil war as the Algerian conflict in the 1990s.
What counts as change?
Incrementalism from without mirrors incrementalism from within manifest, across North Africa
and the Middle East, in the partial relaxation of government control over society, carving up
spaces of free expression (particularly thanks to the new Internet-based media), greater pluralism
in the officially sanctioned public sphere at the national and local level. This begs the question of
what is meant by change and to what degree our normative yardsticks are adequate when
confronted with hard facts.

Change has multiple aspects: political, economic, socio-cultural. Politically, it refers to
the conversion of governance systems, progressive affirmation of rights and freedoms, renewal of
leadership, rule of law. While enhancing liberty and distributing more evenly resources, such
shifts might have human costs too, as we are reminded by Mehdi Lahlou’s paper in this dossier.
Furthermore, it cannot be reduced to stylized processes such as the evolution to a modern
consumerist ethic, rapid ‘regime change’, or externally induced democratization conforming to
Western ideas. Non-Western societies such as India or Japan stand as a proof that democratic rule
comes in various, often dissimilar, shapes and modes. For the Arab world, long-term horizons
remain open. Europe’s model of ‘open society’ based on the freedom of expression, political
representation through parties, trade unions and civic movements marshals no majority amidst
south Mediterranean societies, let alone the authoritarian leadership. International surveys such as
the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR), Freedom House or the Bertelsmann
Transformation Index (BTI), show more continuity rather than change in terms of political rights
and liberties across North Africa and the Middle East. This grey area between democracy and
autocracy has been attributed different labels in the literature, varying from ‘authoritarian rule’
(O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986), ‘limited pluralism’ or ‘multipartism under control’
(see contribution of Ezzeldeen below), ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky, Way 2002),
‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Diamond 2002, Schedler
2002), ‘hybrid regimes’ (Karl, 1995) to ‘defective democracies’ (Merkel, Puhle and Croissant,
2006). In such conditions, change may also mean ‘backsliding’, meaning young or emerging
democracies’ regressing to authoritarian rule. Last but not least, we might conceive of it as
reforms in the direction of an Islamic democracy, a model, which remains vague and open to
contestation.
Interconnectedness between economic liberalization and political reform is equally a sore
spot in the academic and policy debate. The recent financial and economic crisis has given
credence to arguments favouring the strong state and state capitalism and therefore the weakening
of the liberal democracy model. This delights authoritarian leaders, in Arab countries and
elsewhere, supporting their strategies of hindering or managing political openings. High
unemployment, coupled with domestic and interstate conflicts and weak channels of
representation are additional factors stymieing transformation.

For all its variability in terms of intensity and trajectory, gradual change seems to lead
into two particular directions. The first path could be termed, following Steven Heydemann
(2007), upgraded authoritarianism. It is associated with selective reforms implemented in a topdown
fashion whose principal goal is to ensure continuity. As we know from the experience of
pacted transitions across the ‘northern Mediterranean’ in the 1970s, survival is invariably the
primary motivation for incumbent elites such as the families belonging to the Makhzen in
Morocco. However, in North Africa and the Middle East, the capacity of the ancien régime to
control and shape the rules of engagement are incomparably higher as is its ability to co-opt
emergent elites, e.g. the new business classes born out in Algeria’s experiments with
marketization (see Amel Boubekeur’s paper below) or as a result the infitah policy in Egypt since
the 1970s, into the networks of power (cf. Brynen et al, 1995). Rather than outright repression,
upgraded authoritarianism has relied on softer instruments such as access to wages and
employment, disbursal of state subsidies, extension of patronage, alliances with the private sector
cemented by rents generated by the opening to EU and global markets. As observed by Eberhard
Kienle (2001), the linkage between liberalization and democratic transition could be a ‘grand
delusion’.

To fend off external and internal pressures, governments would often adopt progressive
legislation, which would remain on paper owing to lack of political will and/or scarce
institutional capacity for implementation. Recent laws such as Morocco’s Press Code or
Associations’ Act serve as good illustrations. Analysts have registered that measures undertaken
under the ENP Action Plans, such as introducing a 20 per cent quota for women in Jordan’s local
authorities, are rarely followed up by further reforms (Comelli and Paciello, 2009). Regimes
maintain their hold over civic activism through co-opting so-called GONGOs, that is NGOs with
strong connections to the authorities. They are also increasingly apt to steer, rather than directly
rig, competitive elections through gerrymandering, electoral laws and other means to skew the
playing field. Once elected parliaments have been sidelined in the decision-making process and
powerlessness has discouraged participation in elections (Kausch, 2009).
To be fair, upgraded authoritarianism could be read as a product of negotiation between
incumbent elites and challengers. In fact, it brings parts of the ‘Southern Mediterranean’ closer to
cases of hybrid regimes exhibiting a combination of democratic and authoritarian traits in other
corners of the world, from Russia to Latin America. In time, the PR efforts to meet the EU and
US demands for reforms might also entrap a number of governments and push them further on
the path of gradual liberalization limiting the scope for the otherwise habitual moves towards
‘deliberalization’.

Upgraded authoritarianism therefore contrasts with the second path, that of authoritarian
re-entrenchment where cautious opening is followed by recourse to coercion and repression. The
case of Egypt is particularly instructive in this respect. The presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2005 were preceded by a democratic opening on an unprecedented scale, which had
to do with the mobilization of the largely secular opposition groups such as the Kefaya movement
and the al-Ghad party, and pressure from the Bush administration. The brief democratic moment
manifest in the multicandidate race for the presidency and the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood’s
winning 20 per cent of seats in parliament was short-lived. In 2007, the regime personified by
Mubarak and the National Democratic Party (NDP) amended the Constitution to curb the rise of
the Muslim Brothers and the secular opposition as well as to rein in the increasingly activist
judiciary (Shehata, 2009). This turn to authoritarianism is reminiscent of past episodes of
‘rollback’, e.g. in the early 1990s. Still, Nahed Ezzeldeen’s contribution to this collective edition
argues that Kefaya and the ‘people power’ interlude of 2005 poses a long-term challenge to
Mubarak’s grip on power.
Such policies have been rationalized by the rising prominence of security in domestic
politics as well as in dealings with the EU and US. In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s
second term in office (2004-2009) was marked by a hardening of the regime in response to the reemergence of radical Islamist militancy spearheaded by the self-styled Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) after 2006. It came after a period when the regime was increasingly
‘civilianizing’ and using the Civil Concord to co-opt former Islamic militants and their families
through money filling the state coffers thanks to the spike in gas and oil prices (Darbouche,
2009). Americans and western Europeans’ fears of transnational terrorism and political Islam
more generally has given repression a veneer of legitimacy, with the ENP instruments not being
used to pressure authoritarian-minded governments to liberalize. Countries such as Syria and
Libya have, at various times, resisted both ENP and the Association Agreements under the
Barcelona Process as either detrimental to national economies or a neo-colonialist plot; Algeria
resisted the ENP Action Plan. Despite that, these countries have been able to forge close links
with individual member states on account of their importance as diplomatic allies, energy suppliers or gatekeepers controlling illegal migration into Europe.

The presence of those two paths suggests that incremental change may or may not be
geared towards positive outcomes. They also challenge the assumption that socio-economic
openness or even advancement in governance leads directly, as a deus ex machina, to rapid
democratization or even another wave of ‘coloured revolutions’. Once these assumptions, central
to the political discourse of the 1990s, are set aside it becomes relatively straightforward to study
empirically the evolving dynamics of civil society, migrant networks, businesses, including the
interplay with the political system. Especially given the fact that civil societies in the Southern
Mediterranean sometimes are more developed, in tune with modern trends and interconnected
between each other than governmental agencies and political bodies.
Who are the agents of change?

Looking at the region at hand, one notes the great variety and diversity of agents. Country-based,
subnational, local, segmental, social class, political cultural and other differences and specificities
all account for heterogeneity. Such agents might push for democracy by promoting civic rights
and challenging regimes, e.g. over political expression or the lack of just access to resources.
Agents of change can be elite actors, intellectuals, artists, media, mudawen (bloggers); individual
activists but also broader societal groups such as (lower) middle class businessmen, civil
campaigners as the members of Kefaya, migrants, youth; political parties, foundations, thinktanks
but also trade unions or broader social movements.

What matters is the demand for good governance and political representation, in that such
agents transmission and voice the dissatisfaction of broader groups in society into the political
arena. In that respect, agents of change are not necessarily coterminous with the NGO scene in
the countries in question. They can also be governmental actors embracing reform. In any case,
distinctions should always be taken cum grano salis. Even ‘classical’ actors such trade unions,
are sometimes state controlled in some Arab countries. That is why NGOs and, significantly,
non-violent (mainstream) Islamist movements increasingly take the role of a mouthpiece for
citizens’ concerns and engage in social welfare issues.
Islamists deliberate extensively whether they should participate within established
political systems or rather stay without (see Nahed Ezzeldeen’s paper below). Even if Islamist
actors are unlikely to embrace liberal values, they are, too, definable as agents of change, in the
sense that in most Middle Eastern and North African countries they represent one of the rare
ideological alternatives to the regime (Burgat, 1995, 2007). The prominence of Islamists has to
do with the weakness of liberal opposition movements suffering from internal divisions and
narrow societal appeal. Islamists fill an ideological gap, at least on the discursive level. On the
one hand, in most of the Arab countries, Islamists represent the needs of the vulnerable parts of
society and they contribute to social change. On the other hand, most of these movements take a
(ultra-)conservative stance on social and cultural issues such as women’s rights and
homosexuality. Thus Islamists are simultaneously agents of change and status quo player,
depending on the domain in question. On the other side of the political spectrum, liberal or
progressive agents of change fight for equal rights and freedom of ways of life. Some opposition
movements have opened a little more political space, be it in Lebanon, Algeria or Egypt. Most of
these groups, whether of Islamist or secular background, share one common, overarching cause:
the struggle for rule of law.

Turning to leadership, will the next generation of potential leaders in North Africa and the
Middle East be agents of change? In Egypt, Hosni Moubarak’s son, Gamal (46), is being
groomed for succession in the presidency; in Tunisia, it is Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s son-in-law
Sakher el-Materi (30), and in Libya, Muammar Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam (38). Will hereditary
autocrats opt for political and economic reforms or will they defend family and clan interests?
Leadership renewal in Morocco, Jordan and Syria in 1999 was quickly followed by disillusion
owing to the limited scope and sluggish speed of ensuing change. Today, legitimate political
leaders commanding society’s sympathy is rather exceptional across the region.

International and transnational actors – governments, international institutions,
transnational civil society, migrant networks, diasporas etc. - comprise yet another cluster of
agents. External incentive such as the privileged/advanced status or even the prospect of
membership in the EU may drive political and economic transformation, although the causal
relationship is, alas, not always working. North-South co-operation by civil societies might help,
too. However, the hitherto experience of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean is very different
from that of Eastern Europe or Latin America when it comes to outside linkages and anchors.
Regional organizations (such as the African Union, Arab Maghreb Union, Arab League,
Organization of Islamic Conference) play a marginal role. Outstanding border issues hinder
regional integration and economic exchanges between local countries remain difficult, although
the informal market is growing. Democratic change largely depends on the economic situation in
a given country, or at least, a positive economic situation underwritten by international
institutional webs can help political liberalization and the empowerment of agents of change.
Migrants play a crucial role here because, as Mehdi Lahlou argues, they channel values, ideas
and new impetus to the host countries and make a positive contribution to transformation. The
number of bi-nationals, individuals with a migrant background from Arab countries, Turkey and
Israel living in western Europe, characterized by ‘hybrid identities’ (Foroutan and Schäfer, 2009),
is actually estimated at 20 million and growing. This means that further research should be done
to investigate the role of those groups as catalysts and immediate drivers of transformation.1
Do agents of change make a difference?

Democratization and economic development are largely stalled across the Arab world. The
factors are well-known and need not be repeated here – from the outstanding conflicts to the
persistence of authoritarian structures and the entrenchment of rentier economies. Facing such
structural constraints, actors have limited options but to be co-opted. The capacity for
mobilization and civic action is limited. Conformism and lack of prospects is a problem for
minorities and different-minded people, but most of all for the younger generations, who grew up
with the discrepancies between the external world presented and accessible via satellite TV and
the new media on the one hand, and the stagnating local moral norms and standards on the other.
However, it is important not to understate the transformative potential of such agents. Despite the
somber views expressed by the world’s commentariat or substantiated by the plethora of
governance indices, this collective work suggests that change does take place. As we observe in
Egypt and now, even more significantly, in Iran, public criticism of leaders, be it by individuals,
ad hoc groups or organized movements, exemplifies demand for democracy and rights across the
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (Schäfer and Henry, 2009). The emergence of new
constituencies for change results from the exposure to globalization with the expanding flow of
goods, services, information and ideas across state borders. In countries like Egypt, two decades
of economic reform have produced new middle classes and employees in the private sector, who
are not directly dependent for their welfare on the otherwise omnipresent state. If one believes in
historical parallels then the cases of Spain in the 1960s and Turkey in the 1980s where economic
transformations set the scene for political change spring to mind, although the experience of
1 A long-term research project on Hybrid Euro-Muslim Identity Models and the role of ‘hybrid’ migrants as agents of change is currently being conducted at the Humboldt University Berlin, cf. www.heymat.hu-berlin.de.

Tunisia since it embarked on economic restructuring in 1987 serve as a salutary reminder that the
linkage might not work. While reinforcing social differentiation greater economic openness has
fallen short of creating alternative power centres or challenger elites (Kienle, 2005; Boubekeur in
this dossier).

Technological change associated with globalization has had a more direct effect on the
political process. Websites and blogs have rendered the public sphere more diverse and
politically engaged breathing life into civil society, in contrast to ‘old’ media such as TV and the
press (cf. Mohsen-Finan, 2009). As recent showcase trials in Morocco (followed by royal pardon)
suggest the authorities are in position to reassert their control. They could also temporarily ban
access to Internet sites such as YouTube as it has also happened in democratically more advanced
Turkey. When compared with their past, not with other regions ‘in transition’, societies across the
Southern Mediterranean, even in dictatorships such as Syria and Libya, appear more dynamic and
receptive to change.

Outline
The papers featured below build on the discussions at a series of academic conferences: Agents
of Change in the Mediterranean (Free University of Berlin, 1-4 May 2008/Oxford, 18-19 June
2009) and Mediterranean Unions: Visions and Politics (St Antony’s College, Oxford, 6-7 June
2008). They have formed part of a research project co-piloted by Dimitar Bechev and Isabel
Schäfer under the RAMSES2 Network of Excellence of Mediterranean Studies supported by the
EC Sixth Framework Programme. As other research initiatives of the EU, the spirit of RAMSES2
has been to promote scholarly exchange across the shores of the Mediterranean, between
researchers and universities in the EU and in what bureaucratic language refers to as ‘third
countries’. The intention of the academic events and the resulting themed section is to decentre
the notion of change in a dual sense: away from the world of ‘high politics’ as well as away from
the vantage point of Brussels institutions. This, of course, has been more of a general
methodological preference than a rule fixed in stone so both Europe and government agencies
appear in the case studies alongside with assorted ‘bottom-up’ agents of change. All three papers
investigate how micro-level factors, whether the migrants’ pursuit of welfare and status within
local communities in countries of origin and abroad (Lahlou) or indeed business operators’ profitmaking
instincts (Boubekeur) drive social agents in their efforts to re-negotiate their autonomy
vis-à-vis state institutions. These vivid and rich case studies add empirical flesh to the metaquestions
mapped out in the foregoing introduction.

In his contribution, Mehdi Lahlou (INSEA, Rabat) investigates the impact of migration on
society and politics in the Maghreb, with a special focus on the Moroccan case. He hypothesizes
that transnational migration might have transformative effects in three domains: (1) social
change, concerning the empowerment of women, the evolution of work ethics, gains in
educational levels, social solidarity; (2) economic change covering the effects of remittances and
the transfer of skills; and, perhaps most significantly, (3) political change related to the
advancement of democracy and the rule of law. He finds that migrants’ role has been largely
limited to the economy but also procures evidence that the involvement of transnational networks
in local development projects has actually strengthened the quality of democratic participation at
the grass-roots level, particularly in peripheral areas traditionally neglected by the state. At the
same time, Lahlou argues, in agreement with much of the literature, that migration from Sub-
Saharan Africa transiting the Maghreb en route to Western Europe has led to the tightening of
local regimes and reinforcement of heavy-handed authoritarian practices curtailing human rights.
Nahed Ezzeldeen (Cairo University) discusses the politics of protest in Egypt, with a reference to
the Kefaya (‘enough!’) movement emerging in 2004. Her paper tackles two main questions: (1)
what were the social and historical origins of such a protest movement?; (2) what were the effects
of Kefaya’s appearance on Egypt’s political scene? She sees Kefaya in light of multiple past
precedents of citizen action, both before and after the 1952 revolution. Ezzeldeen contends that
despite the movement’s demise after 2005 it has managed to create a more cohesive opposition to
the regime from hitherto disparate social groups and actors while also nurturing a culture of
protest. Far from being a success and falling seriously short of overblown initial expectations
inside Egypt and abroad, Kefaya’s primary accomplishment has been the broadening of political
space for protest and human rights advocacy by citizens as well as the questioning of the
regime’s legitimacy. It has also created alliances, albeit temporarily, bridging cleavages related to
social class, political values (Muslim Brotherhood vs. the secular opposition), regional divides
(Cairo-vs.-provincial governorates), and confession (Muslims vs. Copts). Ezzeldeen furthermore
believes that the movement has had a significant demonstration effect on other Arab countries.
Looking at the role business elites in Algerian politics, Amel Boubekeur (Carnegie
Middle East Centre) takes a frontal attack against the commonplace notion in the literature that
economic liberalization leads, in a deterministic fashion, to democratic and good-governance
reform. She studies the transformation of the managerial class of post-independence Algeria’s
socialist economy into a full-fledged business elite, starting in the 1980s. In her view, these elite
became enmeshed in the clientelist structures centred on the ubiquitous trio of power, the FLN,
army and civil services, benefiting from the boon of the hydrocarbon economy. To her, the rising
prominence of business figures in the public sphere is reflective, first and foremost, of the
authorities’ strategy of diversifying sources of support through co-optation, in the wake of the
destructive civil war in the 1990s. However, the paper concludes that, at the end of the day, new
economic elites’ political loyalties are at best shifty. Their present support for the status quo does
not preclude a re-orientation towards a political regime seen as more acceptable by the public at
large, which in turn would legitimize Algerian private business’ increased participation in the
circles of power.

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Migrants as Agents of Change
in the Euro-Mediterranean Area
Mehdi Lahlou
Introduction
International migration brings change for the people involved as well as for their families and
society at large. Migrants leave their country of birth to settle in another country, generally more
advanced economically, politically and culturally. Living for extended periods in new societies,
migrants acquire new values and behavioural patterns, while also improving their living
conditions, which might also alter their perceptions and relationship with society and contribute
to democratization and socio-economic progress in the sending countries. Upon return to their
original residence, emigrants become, one way or another, agents of change. Whatever its origins
and causes may be, the migration of million of persons all over the world is a channel of
economic and cultural enrichment for both sending and host countries. Historically, societies not
benefitting from human exchanges are disadvantaged in terms of economic development, science,
culture etc. Migrants bring in new skills, tastes, modes of life and ideas. They also provide
economic support for their families and communities back in the country of origin and, channel
new social, cultural and political values as well as organizational knowhow. This is observed by
many international bodies, including the UNDP:
‘In migrants’ countries of origin, the impacts of movement are felt in higher incomes and
consumption, better education and improved health, as well as at a broader cultural and social level.
Moving generally brings benefits, most directly in the form of remittances sent to immediate family
members. However, the benefits are also spread more broadly as remittances are spent—thereby
generating jobs for local workers—and as behaviour changes in response to ideas from abroad.
Women, in particular, may be liberated from traditional roles. (…) However, international
migration, even if well managed, does not amount to a national human development strategy. With
few exceptions (mainly small island states where more than 40 per cent of inhabitants move
abroad), emigration is unlikely to shape the development prospects of an entire nation. Migration is
at best an avenue that complements broader local and national efforts to reduce poverty and
improve human development. These efforts remain as critical as ever’ (UNDP, 2009).

UNDP’s arguments are confirmed by the recent historical experience of southern European
countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece or Portugal, many of whose citizens sought employment in
northern Europe for a long period ending in the 1970s. After making considerable savings abroad
and returning home, these migrants contributed to the transition to democracy as well as to social
and economic development (Cipollone, 2005). Migration from the Maghreb, particularly
Morocco, towards Western Europe began in 1960. It connected Europe’s industrialized and
institutionally advanced societies, still dealing with the demographic and material consequences
of the Second World War, to migrants of rural background with little or no formal education.
Migrants came in search of better living standards, intending to eventually return to their country
of origin and share material benefits with their families. However, they chose to stay longer in the
host countries and progressively integrated in local societies, which influences their outlook. This
adds to their role of agents of change in countries of origin. Such effects could be detected, for
instance, in the field of demography. Women of Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian origin adopted
attitudes towards procreation similar to those of their counterparts in Europe. Change also
occurred with respect to politics and social activism. Migrants returning to Morocco reinforced
the local trade union movement as well as left-wing political parties. In the beginning of the
1980s, Moroccan Parliament accepted five new members to represent the emigrants in Europe. At
the same time, migrant remittances grew to nearly 10 per cent of Morocco’s GDP, with important
repercussions on the national economy. Such developments resulted from factors such as the
relative integration of Maghrebis in host societies and the low level of unemployment among the
migrant populations as well as across Western Europe in general.
The following paper addresses a series of questions regarding international migration,
with a reference to the case of the Euro-Mediterranean area (here, North Africa and Western
Europe). What are the causes pushing people to emigrate, or wish to emigrate, from their country
of origin? What are the main political and human consequences of migration for the migrants
themselves and their countries of departure? What is the (potential) role of migrants as agents of
change affecting the social economic, and political conditions in countries of origin, which often
constitute ‘push factors’ for emigration in the first place?
Prior to examining those questions, one needs to specify what is meant by ‘change’.
Social change relates to shifts in areas such as empowerment of women, work ethics, the role of
education and schooling, social cohesion and solidarity. Economic change covers the effect of
migrant remittances on the economy of the countries of origin as well as the consequences of the
transfer of skills. By political change, one understands acceptance of democratic rules, respect of
difference and, more broadly, support for the rule of law.

Causes of migration

When one analyses the evolution of migration from Africa, a phenomenon much discussed in the
media, and especially from the Maghreb, one could clearly link with to economic and social
underdevelopment as well as the lack of democracy and guarantees for social rights in the region.
Another factor is the increasing attraction of the lifestyle and standards enjoyed by populations in
Western Europe, owing to the development of new information technologies and the concomitant
exposure to images of ‘European life’ all around Africa over the last two decades. Young urban
dwellers, mainly male but increasingly women too, are most receptive to those images. For them,
European countries (and, to a lesser degree, North America) represent the best option in terms of
freedom, personal rights, living standards, leisure, etc.
Attractiveness has grown over time due to the psychological impact of the introduction of
visa regimes by the EU member states in the 1990s as part of the implementation of the Schengen
Agreement. Restricting legal migration, even for short visits, tourism or healthcare purposes, has
resulted in the sense that access to Europe is prohibited for ‘non-white and non-rich people’. The
process contributed to the rise of clandestine border crossings and transformed human flows that,
until the mid-1980s, took place in both directions, from North Africa to Western Europe and vice
versa. Migration policies came to be dominated by the fear that migrants would never return to
their countries of origin.

This suggests that poverty is not the main driver of Maghrebi emigration. Looking at
poverty, one should not focus on the individual level and personal income falling below the
‘absolute poverty line’ as determined by the World Bank. As shown by numerous studies on the
Maghreb, emigrants leaving their place of origin, and subsequently their countries, are young
people between the age of 16 and 35. Many among them are school dropouts. Thus, one cannot
speak of connection with poverty as these people are indeed still in an age where they have not
entered the labour market and adult life. At the time of their decision to emigrate and leave their
family and country, poverty does not affect them directly. It is rather the prospect of poverty, i.e.
concern about the future, precariousness of living as well as the absence of hope. Migration is
rooted in the diffuse environment of poverty within families where members do not work and
resources are insufficient. This is a perception of poverty catalysed by the expectations and hopes
of parents and family that the next generation leave as soon as possible and become rich in a
short period of time, help parents and family raise the remainder of siblings and provide material
benefits (e.g. a new car). This is again captured by the UNDP:
‘For many people in developing countries, moving away from their home town or village
can be the best—sometimes the only—option open to improve their life chances. Human
mobility can be hugely effective in raising a person’s income, health and education
prospects. But its value is more than that: being able to decide where to live is a key
element of human freedom. When people move, they embark on a journey of hope and
uncertainty, whether within or across international borders. Most people move in search of
better opportunities, hoping to combine their own talents with resources in the destination
country so as to benefit themselves and their immediate family, who often accompany or
follow them. If they succeed, their initiative and efforts can also benefit those left behind
and the society in which they make their new home’ (UNDP, 2009).
An additional push factor is the example provided by children of neighbours who had left before
and the welfare resulting from their remittances. Those children would typically return for a
month each year for annual vacations to display personal wealth in their home community.
Perception of deprivation is reinforced by deficient public services, e.g. the absence or the
insufficiency of healthcare and medical insurance. It is also related to the immediate physical
environment: the aridity of the terrain, the absence of green areas, lack of public places, and the
disfiguration of urban space. Added to that is the sense of the loss of freedom and
disempowerment, with emigration as the only way to mend this state of affairs. Poverty leads to a
constant conflict with authorities marked by fear, disrespect and incompatibility. Poverty is a
push factor for migration only as ‘relative poverty’. Poverty in absolute terms is actually a barrier
preventing human mobility.

Emigration, even when decided upon and carried out individually, is initially a project of
a group, family or tribe. It is reflected, nurtured and prepared a long time in advance. Failure to
fulfil the project, by refusal to leave or premature return, is seen as a defeat bringing infamy for
the person in question as well as for his family. In the same vein, prevention or any other action
aimed at reducing migration could be successful only insofar as it adopts a group approach. Such
strategies should improve the living conditions of the whole of community, and not only of a part
of its constituents. Preventive action should target all the causes driving people to emigrate across
countries and continents. However, such an ambitious program must be undertaken in partnership
by local and international agents capable of changing the conditions of life in the countries of
origin.

Human and political costs of migration controls
Taking considerable risks in order to leave the country of origin and enter another country,
migrants often face dramatic consequences (IEMed, 2007). As such consequences affect
significant numbers of migrants, they also influence interests of states, with implications for the
domestic and international political order. The tremendous human cost of illegal migration is
generally well-publicized, and they tend to grow with the imposition of further border controls,
mainly by European states, aimed at reducing them. The political costs of migration are most
salient for transit countries such as Morocco. Having low bargaining power and negotiation
capacity, these countries depend in terms of resources, trade and FDI on European states who are
highly concerned by migratory flows. The same states have important interests in the countries of
origin whose help they could enlist by securing alignment with Europe’s migratory policies.
The human costs border control policies adopted almost everywhere throughout the world
during the pas five-six years are enormous. Public opinion in both the countries of origin and of
destination is kept alert by images of drowned migrants’ bodies retrieved from the sea. Beside
hundreds of North African and Sub-Saharan irregular migrants losing their life by drowning
and/or thirst during their journey to Europe, many are killed by the security forces policing land
borders. This is a direct consequence of agreements signed between countries like Libya,
Morocco or Egypt and the EU. All in all, according to the European Network against
Nationalism, Racism, Fascism and in Support of Migrants and Refugees, some 13,250 migrants
died between January 1993 and April 2009 while trying to reach one of the countries of the EU.
On this total, 1,079 migrants died only in the period 1 January-23 April 2009. More than twenty
people were shot by the Spanish and Moroccan border guards between August and October 2006,
with dozens wounded and several sustaining permanent bodily damage including loss of limb or
some vital functions. More recently, Egyptian police have shot dead at least six African migrants
at the Egyptian-Israeli frontier since May 2009. This number is to be added to another 28
migrants killed in the same border in 2008. Apart from these deaths by drowning, thirst, hunger
or shootings, generally followed by detentions in very poor conditions and thousands of
deportations, it is worthwhile to mention the daily violence suffered by Sub-Saharan migrants.

The Italian journalist Fabrizio Gatti provided terrifying reports in his 2008 book Bilal on the
Road of the Clandestine Migrants of the journey made by those migrants, particularly between
Niger and Libya (Gatti, 2008).
In Morocco, where the illegal migrants resided in relatively peaceful conditions until
2000-2002, the tightening of migration policy and harmonization with Europe’s standards led to
violence. The situation of migrants has been documented by a detailed reported drafted by the
MSF, a Spanish NGO. It found that ‘between April 2003 and May 2005, out of 9,350 medical
consultations the examinations provided to migrants, 2,193 were related to acts of violence. This
means that almost 23.5 per cent of all persons examined were directly or indirectly victims of
violence.’ According to the same report, violence resulted in severe trauma due to falls from
separation fences on the Moroccan-Spanish borders, gunshot wounds, beatings or attacks by
dogs. Cases of death and sexual violence have also been recorded. In the words of the NGO,
‘[m]any sub-Saharan immigrants [had] stated that the Moroccan and Spanish law enforcement
officers were responsible [for physical injuries sustained]’. According to MSF, ‘violence against
immigrants can be broken down as follows: more than 65 per cent of all cases are attributed to
security forces of both countries and more or less 30 per cent to offender groups and trafficking
networks’. A vulnerable group, women are constantly the targets of sexual violence. Sub-Saharan
women are considered by human trafficking networks as a valuable commodity and exploited as
prostitutes. These women often do not pay their journey or their protection but fall into the
clutches of violent members of their communities who claim leadership as well as personal rights
over them. These women travel most of the time in groups, under the protection of ‘their’ men
who keep them in secret places accessible only to those authorized by the criminal boss. In
exchange for this ‘protection’, they must provide sexual services to anyone introduced to them,
be they inhabitants of the transit countries or migrants. MSF also collected several testimonies of
migrant women who, when they get sick, lose the support of their protector and are abandoned,
and sometimes, in the worst cases, even disappear.
Owing to its geographical location in North Africa, only 14 km away from the European
coast, and its own socio-economic deficits, Morocco is the centre of the Euro-Mediterranean
migration issues, with respect to both its citizens and also Sub-Saharan migrants. Authorities in
Rabat have come under pressure by EU members to bolster border security and fight irregular
migration from Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, such a policy would harm Morocco’s
standing in countries like Senegal, Niger, Guinea and Ivory Coast, which have been its staunch
supporters in the West Sahara conflict with Algeria. The EU is the main economic partner for
Morocco. It’s the recipient of 74 per cent of its exports and source of 52 per cent of imports. EU
countries are home to most Moroccan migrants living abroad. Nearly 2.5m Moroccans reside in
the Union, of which 1.5m are in France and 0.5m in Spain. Moreover, hundreds of French and
Spanish enterprises are present in Morocco’s financial and services sectors. Politically, the failure
of the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) launched in 1989, Morocco’s 1984 withdrawal from
the Organization of African Unity, and the ineffectiveness of the Arab League have rendered
relations with the EU of strategic value as the sole security guarantee in an inhospitable regional
environment. European states see Morocco not only as an important market but also as one of the
most stable countries of the area which made steps towards democratization worth encouraging.
The increasing prominence of Sub-Saharan migration in the 1990s turned Morocco a potential
gatekeeper of the EU borders extended to the south of the Mediterranean Sea. Like Senegal, Mali
or Libya, Morocco opted for a migration policy totally in line with the European approach \'of
outsourcing the management of migration flows\'. Rapprochement with Spain, France and the EU
in general was furthered by the argument that Morocco was ‘a victim of its geographical position’
due to its intermediary position on the migrants’ path to Europe. This resulted, in particular, in
strong convergence of views between Moroccan and Spanish officials influencing relations with
the rest of the EU and ending the climate of enmity that had prevailed in 2001-2002. Algeria and
Sub-Saharan Africa were increasingly singled out as countries of origin, especially after the
attempts of migrants to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the autumn 2005
(Driessen, 2009).
Agents of change and migration
The potential beneficial outcomes of migration explored in the introduction are inhibited because
of certain political developments concerning Maghrebi migrants in Europe. They face grave
problems as regards integration, even in societies that until recently were considered liberal and
open such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Italy or Spain. The tendency to live secluded
in their communities gained momentum leading to greater marginalization in the host country.
Unemployment rates grew, well before the 2008-9 economic crisis, while living conditions
deteriorated. As a result, the channels of social exchanges between the two groups, majorities and
Maghrebi migrants, became blocked, retrenching migrants in the belief and value systems
brought from rural societies in the country of origin. Migrant groups cannot be regarded as an
agent of change except in purely economic terms, that is regarding the effects of remittances on
their families and the wider community. Deeper socio-economic transformation would involve
reducing emigration rates and also encouraging voluntary return towards the places of origin.
This is contingent on the action of national and local institutions and actors as well as on more
benign regulation on migratory flows by states.
Agents of change at the inter-state level and within the EU
At the inter-state level, particularly as regards to the relations EU-Maghrebi relations, change
depends on the reconsideration of the main principles behind Euro-Mediterranean co-operation.
Deepening economic gaps is a major source of tension between the EU and the North African
countries, otherwise connected via free-trade regimes. Certain intra-EU policies such as the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have had particularly detrimental effect, especially in the
context of trade liberalization (Lahlou, 2003). A more favourable regime will help growth in
southern Mediterranean countries while enhance environmental standards and optimize the use of
increasingly scarce resources, notably water. That will reduce the growing threat of migration
driven by environmental degradation. The current focus on policing borders and security should
be replaced by long-term developmental strategies and public policies based on shared ownership
and responsibility by the EU (Badie, et al, 2008), North Africa (including Algeria and Libya,
besides Morocco) and the Sub-Saharan Africa countries suffering greatly because of the loss of
human capital. Here, the key potential for change is in the hands of EU institutions such as the
European Parliament, generally concerned about issue of human rights, underdevelopment and
poverty, and the Commission, especially its directorates dealing with development aid and
humanitarian assistance (OECD, 2009).
The economic crisis limits the opportunities to steer public opinion in Europe towards
assessing in a positive light migration, especially in its clandestine form. It also shifts attention
away from the economic and social development of the poorest regions of Africa. Still, there is
an opportunity exists today to reverse that tendency by political parties and especially European
NGOs who are not susceptible to electoral pressure to provide publics with information and
mobilize popular opinion. A particularly significant role is to be played by local authorities in the
host countries (as well as in the countries of origin) in terms of facilitating human exchanges,
education, transfers of knowledge and knowhow on local development.

Change in the countries of origin
All of the above changes depend on transformation in the countries and areas of origin carried out
by local individuals, groups, communities and institutions. They should serve two goals:
• Ensure that migration does not become an indefinite, long-term substitute solution for
economic and social challenges at the local level;
• Harness the developmental potential of migration, beyond the remittances which typically
finance only consumption by the migrants’ families.
Many scholars acknowledge the positive role of migrants, both living abroad and returnees, – the
ones who are still living abroad and the returnees, in terms of development. In the words, of Jean-
Pierre Cassarino:
‘Since the mid-‘80s, there has been growing consensus among scholars and policy-makers that
international migration could contribute to the social and economic development of sending
countries. Although the issue of migration and development in origin countries has been given more
attention by international organizations, few emigration countries have been involved in defining
the practical provisions necessary to strengthen the link between return migration and development.
Actually, while most emigration countries have adopted policies aimed at attracting remittances and
at increasing their inflows, few policies have been adopted to capitalize and draw on the resources,
knowledge, skills acquired abroad and experiences of (return) migrants. (Cassarino, 2004)’
Naturally, migrants have the will and, under certain conditions, the ability to largely contribute,
thanks to their human, social and financial capital, to the development of their countries of origin.
That is achieved through the transfer of that capital or by building networks spanning the country
of origin and the host country for the benefit of their families and native communities. Thus,
policies that encourage migrants to contribute to development at home minimize the push factor
in places of departure and limit irregular migration along with its negative human and social
effects. Such can be divided into four categories: (1) economic incentive-based policies; (2)
education and vocational training policies; (3) institution / politics and human rights policies; and
(4) information policies.
Economic incentive-based policies provide economic operators, whether non-migrants and
migrants, with rules, laws and regulations encouraging them to invest and, concerning migrants,
to transfer their capital in their home country. These economic policies involve financial market
regulations, fiscal encouragements, the capacity to access industrial zones, appropriate changes in
social and fiscal regulations. Potential investment projects should benefit from public
contributions where migrants do not have access bank credits.
Education and vocational training policies aim at improving the levels of education which bear
directly on development. Such policies facilitate the legal migration of people with high
/adequate qualifications and provide migrants returning to their country of origin to profit from
additional training as way of re-integration into society.
Institution-building policies complement the previous clusters and refer to the change of laws and
administrative practices to create investor confidence fuelling private initiative by domestic and
foreign residents, including migrants. Such policies should also stress human rights and
protection of individual freedoms, thereby reducing emigration and encouraging the return of
migrants.
Information policies focus on providing migrants with information on their societies and ways to
participate in domestic processes. It should also raise awareness of economic opportunities,
information on investment and on warranties on how to engage in business activities without
being physically present in the country.
The four categories of policy have a macro-level, national outlook. Their design depends on
national institutions: parliament, government, political parties, major NGOs. That would entail
giving a voice to migrant communities in the policy process. During the 1980s, representatives of
Moroccans living abroad were appointed to the Parliament in Rabat, but this is not the case
anymore. Since 2007, however, an institution called Advisory Council of Moroccans Living
Abroad (CCMRE) was created, with about fifty representatives of communities spanning from
Sub-Saharan Africa to North America involved. As its members are not elected, have only
advisory functions and do not deal with domestic socio-economic issues, it is hard to characterize
CCMRE as an agent of change. Moroccans living abroad are absent from national debates and,
by and large, do not influence politics.

Migrants as agents at the local level
The situation becomes completely different when moving from the national to the local level.
Historically, Morocco has been marked by great regional imbalances in economic and social
development resulting from the absence of the state intervention, poor infrastructure and public
services. Growth and development have been largely confined to the Atlantic coast and the
Northwest. This has prompted researchers and observers to habitually divide the country’s
territory into ‘useful’ and ‘useless Morocco’. The areas of emigration have been primarily located
in the latter regions where the state is absent while social and economic development is deficient.
The sense of being abandoned breeds strong opposition vis-à-vis of the state. Poverty and
underdevelopment have therefore the following effects:
• Young people are obliged to emigrate, but are also wish to maintain economically their
families back home;
• There is a strong feeling of regional identity and will to address the predicament, largely
blamed on the state.
The areas of Tafilalet in east-central Morocco and the area of Souss/Anti-Atlas in the West
provide a good illustration. In those provinces, family and tribal bonds have been traditionally
strong which enables migrants to play a significant role. Their individual actions have a very
pronounced community dimension. The relationship between the migrants and their communities
long remained focused on remittances ensuring the welfare of the family and annual visits. From
the middle of the 1980s onwards, that started changing due to a constellation of factors:
- Internally, state policies evolved thanks to liberalization, opening to civil society and the
devolution of power through elections of local representatives.
- Outside Morocco, the profile of migrants changed, too. The average age of Moroccan
diaspora became lower, education and skills improved as did social and political
awareness.

In host countries, migrants learned how to organize and act collectively through trade unions and
NGOs. The sharp drop of airfares over the past year and the facilitated communication via new
and cheaper information technologies has played a part, too. Migrants became more closely
involved in the social life of their communities and families also motivated by the unfavourable
comparison between material conditions in their countries of residence and places of origin and
the resulting sense of injustice. In Tafilalet and Souss, migrants engaged in development projects
and activities of great material and symbolic significance, independently from the administrative
authorities, in a number of fields (Ould Aoudia, 2008: 143-144). That includes access to water, an
issue for large parts of the population especially young girls and the fight against illiteracy,
particularly high with women. Migrants have funded the construction of schools, roads, sanitation
infrastructure and electricity networks, and invested in family agriculture and the handy-craft
sector (Fondation Hassan II, 2007). Two income-generating activities are especially welldeveloped
thanks to remittances’ transfers: carpet manufacturing in Tafilalet and the production
of argan oil in the Souss.